The 21st century is witnessing a global order in flux. The relative decline of American hegemony, the contested rise of China, and the persistent gridlock within multilateral institutions have created a world where legitimacy and authority are increasingly fragmented. In such a turbulent setting, India’s aspiration to be a leader is not merely rhetorical ambition but a logical claim rooted in its unique geopolitical position, democratic ethos, and bridging capacity. Justifying this claim requires situating India against the backdrop of shifting global dynamics, contrasting great-power shortcomings, and recognising the opportunities available for middle powers to shape a new multilateralism.
If Delhi wishes to shape the rules of a turbulent world it must shoulder greater responsibilities is largely valid. Neither Washington nor Beijing commands universal legitimacy—Washington because of its selective use of power and growing domestic fragility, and Beijing because of its authoritarian practices and coercive diplomacy. This opens a space for India to emerge as a credible and stabilising actor. As a democracy that retains strategic autonomy, India speaks both to the developed North and the aspirational South. Its leadership roles in the G20, BRICS, Quad, and the UN already show its potential to bridge divides.
However, to move from voice to leadership, India must commit resources and political capital. Leadership means not only demanding reforms but also providing development finance, contributing to peacekeeping, and championing inclusive global rule-making on issues such as climate change, digital governance, and trade. In a turbulent era, New Delhi’s credibility will rest on whether it can turn inclusivity and balance into enduring principles of a new multilateralism.
Trump’s Worldview and the Limits of Supra-Nationalism
Part of the turbulence India must navigate arises from the retreat of the United States from its traditional role as guardian of the liberal order. Donald Trump’s worldview captures this shift vividly. He rejects supra-nationalism—the idea that authority can transcend the nation-state in favour of global institutions—as naïve and ineffective. For Trump, peace and prosperity are secured not by global governance but by sovereign states pursuing their interests directly, engaging in deals and negotiations when convenient but never surrendering authority. This “America First” doctrine delegitimises multilateral institutions by portraying them as inefficient bureaucracies that dilute sovereignty and fail to deliver outcomes.
In contrast to the liberal optimism that followed the Cold War, Trump redefined cooperation as transactional and interest-based, not institution-driven. This scepticism towards supra-nationalism has weakened the very structures that sustained stability for decades. India, therefore, faces both the challenge of operating in an era of American retrenchment and the opportunity of stepping into a leadership role that values sovereignty while still building cooperative frameworks.
Beijing’s Activism and the Shifting Balance of Influence
While U.S. disengagement has reduced Washington’s influence in global governance, Beijing has pursued a different path. China’s activism in multilateral institutions—through its expanded peacekeeping role, leadership bids within the UN, and the Belt and Road Initiative—has made it an indispensable actor. By offering resources, infrastructure financing, and bloc leadership for the Global South, Beijing has filled much of the vacuum left by American retreat. Its capacity to mobilise developing countries on issues ranging from climate policy to technology governance ensures that no global initiative can ignore its role.
Yet indispensability does not equate to legitimacy. Many states remain wary of China’s coercive economic practices and authoritarian governance model. This leaves space for a third pole of leadership, one that offers inclusivity without coercion and stability without dominance. India, by positioning itself as a democratic alternative with South-South solidarity and North-South credibility, can claim that role in a way Beijing cannot.
Trump’s Critique of the UN and the Opportunity for Middle Powers
Finally, the turbulence of today’s order is further underscored by Trump’s sharp critique of the United Nations. He asserted that his administration had done a better job than the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, claiming to have ended multiple wars where the UN had failed. While his criticism of the Security Council’s paralysis is not without merit, the claim of U.S. superiority is exaggerated and weakly substantiated. The Security Council does suffer from veto-induced inaction, but its long record of peacekeeping and mediation remains significant.
Trump’s assertion, however, highlights a deeper truth: the credibility of the UN and its most powerful body has been eroded. For India, which has long advocated for reforms in the Security Council and greater representation for the Global South, this erosion presents both a challenge and a justification. If existing institutions are failing, then new frameworks or reformed ones are urgently needed. India, with its democratic legitimacy, rising economic weight, and ability to act as a bridge, has both the moral ground and the practical necessity to lead such reform efforts.
Conclusion
The turbulence of the present order stems from three overlapping dynamics: U.S. retrenchment and scepticism of supra-nationalism, China’s activism coupled with mistrust, and the weakening legitimacy of traditional multilateral institutions. In this uncertain landscape, India’s claim to leadership rests on its ability to act as a responsible middle power that bridges divides, crafts inclusive frameworks, and commits resources to stabilising the global system. If New Delhi chooses to shoulder the responsibilities that come with such a role, it will not only justify its leadership but also help craft a new multilateralism suited for an age where neither Washington nor Beijing can command universal legitimacy.